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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff and, ; 
Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
CLARK LE ROY BERGESNON ] 
Defendant and ] 
Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 20564 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff charged that defendant had committed a 
second degree felony in the State of Utah. At arraignment, the 
defendant entered a plea of not guilty. After plea bargaining, 
the offense was reduced to a third degree felony and defendant 
withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of guilty. 
DISPOSITON OF THE LOWER COURT 
Based upon the guilty plea of the defendant, the court 
entered a judgment that the defendant serve five (5) years in the 
Utah State Penitentary and suspended sentence upon the terms that 
the defendant enter into an agreement with Adult Probation and 
Parole to abide by the probation agreement and to serve six (6) 
months in the Box Elder County Jail. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In February of 1981, a motion to set aside sentence of 
court and resentence the defendant was heard and denied and in 
November of 1984 a motion to set aside the guilty plea was filed 
by the defendant and denied on February 26, 1985. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant, who appeals from the judgment of conviction 
entered upon his plea of guilty and the order denying the 
defendant's motion to set aside guilty plea, seeks the reversal 
of his conviction, enforcement of his plea bargain or the vacat-
ing of his sentence as detailed in the argument portion of this 
brief. In the alternative and in the event this court concludes 
that the record herein lacks facts essential to the proper and 
complete disposition of the case, defendant seeks remand to the 
District Court for an evidentiary hearing. 
STATEMENTS OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the prosecutor adhered to his promise to 
recommend no incarceration. 
2. Whether it was proper for the court to accept a 
guilty plea pursuant to a plea bargain and then sentence the 
defendant contrary to the plea bargain without giving defendant 
an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. 
3. Whether defendant's guilty plea was voluntary. 
4. Whether defendant was misled by the prosecutor 
into believing his plea bargain would be accepted by the court. 
.2. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After the defendant's not guilty plea to the second 
degree felony was entered, plea bargaining took place between the 
Deputy Box Elder County Attorney, Mr. Jon Bunderson, and 
defendant's counsel, Frank M. Wells. The agreement reached, ac-
cording to defendant's counsel, is that the charge would be 
reduced from a second degree to a third degree felony and the 
county attorney would recommend to the court that the defendant 
be placed on probation with no incarceration. Mr. Bunderson told 
the defendant's counsel that the prosecutor's office would make a 
strong recommendation to the court that the defendant not be in-
carcerated and expressed the opinion that, while the recommenda-
tion of his office would not bind the court, he believed the 
court would not act contrary to the recommendation. Based upon 
this assurance, the defendant, on May 19, 1980, entered a plea of 
guilty to the reduced charge. 
The transcript of the proceedings on the day the guilty 
plea was entered clearly shows that there was no meeting of the 
minds between the county attorney and defense counsel as to the 
agreement reached as a result of plea bargaining. The county at-
torney believed that the agreement was that a recommendation 
would be made that the defendant not be imprisoned and it was the 
understanding of defense counsel that the recommendation would be 
that the defendant not be incarcerated. (See transcript of the 
proceedings of May 19, 1980, page 4, lines 5 through 11.) 
.3. 
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Believing that he had been betrayed by the county at-
torney and inadequately represented by his own counsel, the 
defendant did not surrender himself to the Box Elder County 
Sheriff on the date proscribed and, since that date, has been a 
fugitive from justice. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant contends that the prosecutor promised to 
recommend to the court that the defendant not be incarcerated 
and be placed on probation if defendant would enter a guilty 
plea. At the time of the hearing, however, the prosecutor recom-
mended that the defendant not be imprisoned at the Utah State 
Penitentiary. Based upon the failure of the prosecutor to meet 
his committment, it is claimed that the defendant's entry of a 
guilty plea was not voluntary and should be set aside, that the 
defendant should be allowed to enter a not guilty plea and the 
case should be remanded to the District Court for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR PROMISED TO RECOMMEND TO THE COURT 
THAT THE DEFENDANT BE PLACED ON PROBATION WITHOUT 
INCARCERATION AND DID NOT DO SO 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts above, the 
defendant withdrew his not guilty plea and entered a plea of 
guilty based upon the promise made by the prosecutor that he 
would recommend to the court that the defendant not be incar-
.4. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cerated and be placed on probation under an agreement with Adult 
Probation and Parole; however, at the time of the hearing, the 
prosecutor recommended that the defendant not be imprisoned at 
the Utah State Penitentary. 
As a result of the failure of the prosecutor to fulfill 
his commitment, defendant is entitled relief under the authority 
of Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), and United States 
v. Brown, 500 F.2d. 374 (4th Cir. 1974). In both cited cases, 
convictions were reversed because of the failure of the 
prosecutors to adhere to their promises as to what they would 
recommend at the time of sentencing. 
In Santobello v. New York, a new prosecutor apparently 
ignorant of his predecessor's commitment to refrain from making a 
sentencing recommendation instead recommended the maximum sen-
tence of one (1) year for the defendant. The Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction. Mr. Chief Justice Berger, writing for 
the majority, stated: 
This phase of the process of criminal justice and the 
adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of 
guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the 
defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. 
Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is 
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a 
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can 
be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, 
such promise must be fulfilled. 404 U.S. at 262. 
In United States v. Brown, the defendant entered into a 
plea bargain whereby he pleaded guilty to the charge of posses-
sion of stolen mail in consideration for dismissal of a forgery 
.5. 
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charge and a recommendation by the government that he receive a 
sentence of three (3) years to be served at Lorton concurrently 
with the unexpired portion of another sentence. He was, instead, 
sentenced to a term of four (4) years without recommendation that 
it be served at Lorton. At sentencing, a prosecutor other than 
the one who entered into the plea bargain merely brought the plea 
bargain to the attention of the court but made no recommendation 
as had been promised. The Court of Appeals reversed on the 
ground that the MHalf-heartedn recommendation of the new 
prosecutor did not comply with the plea bargain and that it made 
no difference that defense counsel had brought the reasons for 
the plea bargain to the attention of the sentencing court. Hold-
ing that the effect on the sentencing court of the noncompliance 
with the plea bargain was na matter into which we need not 
inquire," the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for sentenc-
ing in accordance with the prosecutorfs recommendation. Calling 
such action necessary for specific enforcement of the plea bar-
gain to which the defendant was entitled, the court wrote: 
In determining significance of the prosecutor's failure to 
fulfill the promise contained in the plea bargain in 
Santobello, the Supreme Court did not inquire into the 
reasons for the breach; nor do we. We have no reason to 
think that the bargain was breached as a result of anything 
more than the failure of the first prosecutor in inform the 
second, and the second's complete candor in responding to 
the inquiry of the District Court. But in Santobello, hing-
ing reversal on the breach of the agreement alone, the court 
attached no weight to the fact that the failure to comply 
with the plea bargain had been inadvertent. 
The staff lawyers in the prosecutor's office have 
the burden of 'letting the left hand know what the 
right hand is doing1 or has done. That the breach 
,6. 
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of agreement was inadvertent does not lessen its 
impact, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499. 
The test established to be applied by us is thus an ob-
jective one - whether the plea bargain agreement has 
been breached or not - irrespective of prosecutorial 
motivations or justifications for failure in 
performance. 500 F.2d at 378. 
The failure by the prosecutor to recommend to the court 
that defendant be placed on probation prior to the court entering 
judgment on defendant here went to the very heart of the plea 
bargain, namely that probation would be recommended and that the 
recommendation of the prosecutor would be accepted and enforced 
by the district court. In this respect, the prosecutor's lapse 
was even more basic than those in Santobello and Brown, which 
went to the content of the recommendation to the court. 
Therefore, the defendant here is entitled to the relief ordered 
by Santobello and Brown. 
POINT II 
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO ACCEPT A GUILTY 
PLEA PURSUANT TO A PLEA BARGAIN AND THEN SENTENCE CONTRARY 
TO THE PLEA BARGAIN WITHOUT GIVING DEFENDANT AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA 
Defendant's counsel and the prosecutor engaged in nego-
tiations culminating in a plea bargain whereby defendant pleaded 
guilty. Under these circumstances, the court should have been 
advised of the plea bargaining. The court would thereafter be 
obliged to follow the prosecutor's recommendation or inform 
defendant that it would not do so and allow him an opportunity to 
.7. 
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withdraw his plea. The failure of the court to permit defendant 
to withdraw his plea of guilty requires this court to vacate 
defendant's sentence and remand the case for sentencing in ac-
cordance with the prosecutor's recommendation. See Santobello v. 
New York and United States v. Brown. 
POINT 111 
DEFENDANT'S CHANGE OF PLEA WAS BASED UPON THE ASSURANCES OF 
THE PROSECUTOR AND WAS, THEREFORE, NOT VOLUNTARY 
At the time that defendant withdrew his not guilty plea 
and entered a plea of guilty, the court asked the defendant if he 
had been promised anything if he entered a plea of guilty. The 
court also asked the defendant if he understood that the court 
was not bound by agreements made between the prosecutor and 
defense counsel. (Transcript of Proceedings P.4) 
The ritual assertion by the court that it was not bound 
by the plea bargain does not offset an otherwise misleading 
impression. This was the holding in Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 
988 (4th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1129 (1973). 
Walters, a petitioner under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255, claimed that 
he was induced into pleading guilty by the prosecutor's unkept 
promise that he would receive a ten-year sentence and that he had 
been sentence to twenty-years in prison instead. This court 
stated: 
.8. 
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If Walters was in fact promised by the Assistant United 
States Attorney that he would receive a ten-year 
sentence, he is entitled to relief. United States v. 
Carter, 454 F.2d. 426 (4th Cir. 1972). Sentencing Wal-
ters was within the authority of no one but the trial 
judge. An assurance by another that Walters would 
receive a particular sentence, therefore, would be a 
promise that could not be kept. An unkept bargain 
which has induced a guilty plea is grounds for relief. 
Santobello v. New York, 404, U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 
L.Ed 2d 427 (1971). 460 F.2d at 991-92. 
At arraignment, the trial court questioned Walters closely as to 
whether anyone had made any promises to him. The Court then 
THE COURT: Do you fully understand that the court, and 
the court alone, is responsible under the law for any 
sentence that is imposed upon a defendant who pleads 
guilty or if found guilty, do you fully understand 
that? 
DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Id. at 992. 
As to the significance of the quoted question and answer, the 
court stated: 
It is doubtful that the trial judge's instruction that 
the length of Walters1 sentence was within his sole 
control would have eradicated the effect of the 
prosecutor's alleged promise to Walters. Ibid. 
The court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case for 
further factual inquiry by the district court. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT WAS MISLEAD BY THE PROSECUTOR INTO BELIEVING HIS 
PLEA BARGAIN WOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE COURT 
As detailed in the Statement of Facts above, defendant 
was mislead by the prosecutor into believing that the court would 
.9. 
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accept his plea bargain. As a result of the misleading impres-
sion which was conveyed to him, defendant entered his plea of 
guilty. The actions of the prosecutor require the specific en-
forcement of defendant's plea bargain as set forth in Clemons v. 
United Sates, 137 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1943). In Clemons, the 
defendant was assured by an Assistant United States Attorney that 
the indictment on which he went to trial charged only a mis-
demeanor and that the maximum sentence was one (1) year. The 
trial judge, however, construed the indictment as charging a 
felony and, after conviction, imposed a sentence of four (4) 
years. On appeal, the court of appeals held that the 
prosecutor's assurances to the defendant as to the possible fu-
ture punishment in the event of conviction required reversal and, 
in addition, rejected the government's argument that the defen-
dant was not prejudiced since he was convicted after trial. The 
court wrote: 
It may well be that Clemons and his counsel acted a bit 
precipitately in accepting this assurance at its face 
value and in proceeding accordingly. It does not fol-
low that they, therefore, acted altogether 
unreasonably. Certainly, the whole procedure smacks of 
surprise, which should if possible be avoided. 
A criminal trial is not, of course, to be likened to a 
game. . . We think accordingly, that Clemons, under the 
circumstances of this case, was deprived of his liberty 
against the spirit, if not the letter, of the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution of the United 
States. We think he has been dealt with unfairly in 
the light of our standards of justice towards those ac-
cused of federal crimes - standards, in our opinion, 
which the courts must always- adequately safeguard and 
must, under all circumstances, zealously protect. 137 
F.2d. at 305-306. 
.10. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a result of the errors commited below, defendant 
respectfully submits that he is entitled to relief as follows: 
ERROR 
I. Failure of Prosecutor 
to Recommend Probation 
II. Failure to Sentence 
Defendant in Accor-
dance with Plea Bar-
gain 
III. Defendant's Change 
of Pleas was Not Vol-
untary 
RELIEF 
Set aside defendant's guilty 
plea and sentence; in the al-
ternative, remand for an evi-
dentiary hearing. 
Specific enforcement of plea 
bargain; in the alternative, 
remand for an evidentiary 
hearing. 
Set aside defendant's guilty 
plea and sentence; in the al-
ternative remand for an evi-
dent iaryOhearing. 
Resp/ct/ui: lits^ ted, 
CHOMA'S/V' BLOWiUI ST 
40 South Sixth/East 
Salt Lake C%v/, Utah 841 .#2 
ADDENDUM 
Accompanying this brief are the two orders sought to be 
reviewed. They are: 
1. Order Denying Motion To Set Aside Sentence, dated 
May 21, 1981 
2. Order Denying Defendant's Motion To Set Aside 
.11. 
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Guilty Plea, dated February 20, 1985 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
&*-&) true I hereby certify that I delivered ro (2) and cor-
rect copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to: 
David L. Wilkinson 
Attorney General for the 
State of Utah 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
this/i^ d ay of November, 1985. 
Thoma-S'R. B lo r jqu i s t 
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A t t o r n e y a t Law 
4 5 North F i r s t East 
Brighara C i t y , Utah 
Te lephone: 734-9464 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
: 
STATE OF UTAH 
P l a i n t i f f 
v s . 
CIARK LEROY BERGESON 
Defendant* 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE SENTENCE 
Criminal Number 1940 
Defendant in this iLatter has filed a Motion To Set Aside the Sentence 
of the Court, seeking a resentencing of the defendant. Plaintiff filed 
a Memorandum in Opposition thereto, and pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties, defendant was granted time to respond to the plaintiff's 
memorandum, and the time now having expired, and the matter having therefore 
been submitted by the parties for decision, and based upon jthe files and 
records of the Court, and the Motions and Memorandums of the parties, and 
good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and 
decreed as follows: 
1. The Court finds the sentence to be legal and proper, and 
therefore denies defendants motion. 
Dated t h i s ^ day of /)7/ty< > 1981. 
^ 
VeNoy Christerfofferson, District Judge 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the fore-
going Order denying Motion to Set Aside Sentence to Mr. Thomas R. Blonquist, 
Attorney for the defendant, Second Floor, Metropolitian Law Building, 431 
South 3rd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, this ^/ - day 
of ) 7 / , 1 9 8 1 . 
7 n £ /7 /-A — 
/• > < -t&>x- A7 -y t<~*-'^yu,-*\. 
Secretary Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THOMAS R. BLONQUIST A0369 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 5330525 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
v
- ] 
CLARK LE ROY BERGESON, ) 
Defendant. ') 
) Criminal No. 1940 
> ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT"S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
) GUILTY PLEA 
The above matter came before the Court pursuant to the 
Motion of the Defendant to Set Aside Guilty Plea. Plaintiff 
was represented by John J. Bunderson and Defendant was 
represented by Thomas R. Blonquist. The matter was submitted 
to the Court on memorandums and having taking the matter 
under advisement to consider the material submitted by the 
parties and having done so and being fully advised in the 
premises, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision on January 
9, 1985, and based thereupon and good cause appearing therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea be and the same hereby is 
denied. 
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DATED this ^/y^day of February, 1985, 
BY THE COURT: 
i<c 
OMER J. CALL -DISTRICT JUDGE 
The undersigned hereby declares that he caused a copy 
of the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to John 
Bunderson, Attorney at Law, 45 North First East, Brigham 
City, Utah 84302 this j£ day of February, 1985. 
/ 
K /—fa 
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